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PARALLEL STRUCTURES IN

HEGEL'S PHAoNOMENOLOGIE AND ENZYKLOPA:DIE
Robert Grant MeRAl T HERE is reason to believe that Hegel would consider our concern with presentation a form of contemporary "misology", -the retreat of thought from the substantial contradictions of its own ma king to a mere interest in the vagaries of the immediate. But this con cern, endemic to much current philosophie thought, represents a mediation of the present with the past in a truly speculative sense, for it is with the self-consciousness of the current standpoint that antecedent configurations progressively reveal their absolute depth. Let it be added that the necessities of presentation are particularly integral to the realization of Hegelian science, and it is our position that the link between absolute knowing and the system proper cannot be understood aside from the act of presentation itself.
Presentation has this signifiance because it is both an externalization hy a universal self and a recollection of absolute content, thereby closing off the selfalienation of the absolute as spirit in time. Indeed, the tension between absolu te substance and its self-knowing that is indicative of this alienation, remains a part of speculative presentation itself, making presentation a peculiarly spiritual phenomenon. Naturally we hope that sorne of these suggestions will cease ta have their assertive quality and become self-evident in the analysis to follow.
Generally speaking, according to Hegel, the absolute is already close to us through its self-presentation under three aspects. Absolute substance has been externalized in its fortuitous happening as real history, coming on the scene through the onesided determination of a "regional" natural consciousness. Once this externalization of the substance in history is complete, there arises the possibility and the need to present the entirety of this content according to its concept, but first as this content appears for natural consciousness. This second presentation enables natural consciousness to understand the absolute determination of its universal self, and ends with the instigation to present that determination as it exists in-and-foritself. 1 1. Heidegger concludes that we can know the absolute al ail on Iv bccause the absolute "lets itscW' be presented. "In keeping with its absoluteness. the Absolute is with us of its own accord. ln its will ta be with us. the Absolule is being present. In itself. th us bringing itself forward, the Absolutc is for itself.
Although the absolute content of each presentation remains essentially the same, this content appears under different aspects according to the fullness of its selfconscious appropriation. This differcntiation has two immediate consequences: the second and third presentations merely "look back" on the original appearance of the absolute in history; and more preciscly, these two presentations (i.e., the Phiinomenolagie and the system) fully present an identical content, but from different stand points. Through speculative science, the absolute idea is present at hand and absolutely present as presentation, -the in-and-for-itself self-knowing essential structure of the actual.
Consequently our analysis of speculative science must go beyond textual exegesis ta an understanding of Hcgel's justification of the 'word' as the true clement in which the absolute is present ta us and ta itself. This involves the concomitant delineation of the manner in which the labour of presentation supersedes the existence of the particular individual as speculative scientist, ta become a presentation of a universal self for contemporary natural consciousncss. As long as this consciousness is characterized by its intuitive time-viewing, the presentation of the absolute as text raises the question of the relation between its timeless actuality and spirit in its temporal mode. 2
The beginning of speculative science, then, is that th in king which witnesses and merges with the will of the absolute ta be present to itself. This beginning is « the free act of thinking which places itself at the standpoint where it is for-itself, and where it generates its object and presents it to itself. »3 However the full self-presentation of the absolu te in the form of speculative philosophy is both the result of seientific witness and its immediate presupposition, a presupposition which determines presentation as the specifically philosophic comprehension of the non-philosophie life of the absolute content in history. This means that we must examine the extent to which a strictly philosophic presentation can offer itself as an exoteric truth ta an initially non-philosophie natural eonsciousness.
That speculative science is intended as an exoteric knowledge for contemporary natural consciousness is evident from its differentiation into its appearing for natural consciousness and ils actuality in-and-for-itself. In speaking of the path of phenomenal knowing as an introduction or a first part of speculative science we are simply designating the chronologieal succession of texts as they arrive on the scene for consciousness: looked at from the absolute standpoint, the Phiinomenalogie is an appearance of the entire content of the system. The transition from the one to the other is guaranteed less through the necessity of their succession' 'for" consciousness than through their original identity in the act of presenting a common absolu te content. In other words, the transition is guaranteed through the differentiation of For the sake of the will of the parouslO alone, the presentation of knowlcdge as a phenomenon is necessary." Hegel'.\· Concept of Experience, cd. J. Gray, Harper & Row, N. Y., 1970. p. 48. 2. These are issues not foreign to biblical exegesis, and as wc shall see, the relation of bcliefby a knowing subjeet to a text presented "for" il poses similar problems. the mode of presentation, a differentiation ultimately determined by the exigencies of the absolute idea itself.
It is because of the systematic structure that lies "beneath" the exoteric path of phenomenal knowing, and hence is only yet an appearing, that this path has its salutary role as a ladder to the scientific standpoint. In the Introduction to the Phiinomenologie Hegel states that, "The experience of itself which consciousness goes through can, in accordance with its concept, comprehend nothing less than the entirc system of consciousness, or the entire realm of the truth of spirit. For this reason, the moments of this truth are presented in their own proper determinateness, viz. as being not abstract moments, but as they are for consciousness, or as consciousness itself stands forth in its relation to them." 4 The presentation of phenomenal knowing is a "whole" in itself because it comprehends the full range of the determinations of the concept as the y first appear in consciousness, but the mode of appearance itself is related to the question of presentation.
The works posterior to the Phiinomenolofiie regard the latter as an appearing of speculative science and as the appearing of speculative science's absolute content. In the Wiss. der Logik Hegel says that "the concept of pure science and its deduction is therefore presupposed in the present work in so far as the Phiinomenologie des Gei.~tes is nothing other than the deduction of it", and again that "pure science presupposes liberation from the opposition of consciousness." 5 However, inspite of these statements as to the necessary presupposition of the Phiinomenofogie, the closed circle of the system itself seems to rule out an introduction to speculative science which is also somehow a part of that system. The only solution to this di lem ma is the conception of the Phiinomenologie as an appearing of science, -an appearing which leaves the dialectieal integrity of the system intact whi\e at the same time presenting its truthfor consciousness.
In addition to this "necessary" first appearance of speculative science for consciousness as described in the Logik, we find in the Enzyklopiidie the suggestion that the determinations of the system, tao, have their presentation first as they exist for consciousness in the Phiinomenologie. Hegel says, "In my Phiinomenologie des Geistes, which on that account was at its publication described as the first part of the system of science, the course taken was to begin with the first, simplest appearance (Erscheinung) of spirit, with Immediate consciousness, and to sketch the dialectic of this consciousness developing toward the stand-point of philosophical science, the necessity of this latter being shown through the process." This appearing science, like the system itself, looks back on the fortuitous manifestation of the absolute in history and re-presents that content according to its concept.
Again we must emphasize that the difference between the two is that the Phiinomenologie presents the determinations of the system as they first appear to 4. Phanomenologie des Geis!es. cd., J. Hoffmeister, Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1952 . Fin., p. 74. Phenomenology afSpirit, trans., A.V. Miller, Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1977 . The page numbers of the English translations wIll be placcd in parentheses following the German citation. natural consciousness. Hegel continues: "The development of the shapes, the specific object of philosophical science, thus is just as much a part of what at first only appears in the limited form of the development of consciousness ; this development must, so to speak, go on behind the back of this consciousness, in so far as its content is retained as the in-itself of consciousness." 6 This absolute content, and its development in shapes, only becomes explicitly for-itself in the self-conscious presentation of the system, where consciousness understands that content as its own.
WeIl, what evidence is there ta suggest that the main determinations of the system appear firs! along the path of phenomenal knowing prior to their recollection in absolute knowing? The section of the Enzyklopéidie devoted to phenomenology offers sorne interesting indications in this regard, particularly paragraph 11437,7 Hegel says, "Reason as the Idea (#213) appears here in the determination of the opposition between the concept and reality in general, of which it is the unit y , and has here the more precise form of the for-itself existing concept, of consciousness and the concept over against external objects present at hand." x The significance of this remark is that Hegel seems to identify the conclusion of the Logik with its concrete determination in consciousness as "Reason", and the Zusatz attached to this paragraph merely confirms this impression. 9
In the Phanomenologie this formaI unit y of concept and objectivity in reason then goes on to realize itself in the observation of nature and as spirit until it achieves in absolute knowing the philosophic comprehension of the totality of its determinations through 100 king back on its content, -a realization that follows the broad outlines of the system itself. This equally implies that the configurations prior to that of reason, i.e., those that make up consciousness and self-consciousness in the Phanomenologie, roughly correspond to the moments of objective logic and subjective logic in the system, The extensive chapter on reason itself presents "for" consciousness the observation of nature and of subjective spirit (the logical and psychologicallaws, physiognomy and phrenology).lo But it is essential to keep in mind that the determinations of the logic, the philosophy of nature, and the philosophy of spirit arc presentcd as they first appear 6. Enz. Vorbegriff. #25 R, p. 59. 7. The following interpretatlün seeks to reconcile O. Poggeler's argument in "Qu'est-ce que la Phénoménologie de l'Esprit"" Archives de Philosophie, avril-juin 1966 Philosophie, avril-juin , p. 2261 Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1971, (177). 9. Enz. #437 Zusatz. (177) . "What we have called in the previolls paragraph universal self-consciousness, that is in ilS truth the concept of Rcason, the concept as it cxists not merely as the logical Idea, but as the Idea has developed into self-consciousness. For, as wc know from logic, the Idea consists in the unit y of subjectivity or the concept, and objectivity."
!O. For a sketch of the correspondance of sections see the Appendix to this article. In his reference to this Appendix, P.-J. Labarrière rightly points out that a more detai!cd parallel would be impossible due to the different modes of presentation. Cf. Introduction à une lecture de fa Phénoménologie de l'esprit, Auhier-Montaigne, Paris, 1979, p. 282 f. P.4.RALLH STRLCTl!RES from the stand point of natural consciousness, and thus contain much infcrcntial, historical material. For example the science of subjective spirit appears fifst tel the understanding under the crude aspect of phrenology, because true science is possible only once this consciousness has traversed ail the configurations in their immediate appearing and recollected them al the level of absolu te knowing. Similarly. the moments of the logic are not presented in the Phanomenologie as they exist in-andfor-themselves, but as they ini[ially are manifest in the configurations or consciousness.
The eorollary of this suggestion that the broad determinations of the system first appear as the path of phenomenal knowing presented for natural consciousness is that the Phiinomenologie constitutes a thematic whole. In other words, the theories which assert that the Phanomenologie "should" have terminated after the chapter on Reason, Il as does the phenomenology in the system, cannot account for the necessity that the Phanomenologie must repeat ail the determinations of the system if it is equally to "look back" on the totality ofthose determinations as they firs! appear in history. And if the "ideal" determinations of consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason did not make up a part of subjective spirit in its timeless actuality, then the system would be unable to supersede either the standpoint of the Phanomenologie or that natural consciousness.
The necessity that the entire system appear as phenomenal knowing, thereby giving that knowing a systematic unit y, derives largely from the exigencies of the speculative presentation of the absolute ideaY The absolute is already present at hand for contemporary natural consciousness of its own volition, so that it is for speculative science to simply witness this presence "when at the close it lays hold of its own concept, i.e., only looks back on its knowledge." 13 Thus philosophic presentation itself demands that the path of phenomenal knowing merely look back on the whole, without truncating that path in order to provide a partial and consequently external "introduction" to speculative science. The Phiinomenologie is justly more than such an introduction because it is an appearance of the system of II. Notably the theory of Th. flearing and hls "disciples" Hoffmeister and Hyppolitc. Howevcr Hyppolirc admits rhat."Ccst comme une exigence interne qui pousse la raison individuelle il dc'cen,!' un monde pour soi-même comme esprit. et l'esprit à se découvrir comme esprit pour soi dans la religion. La méthode de la prise de conscience qui a dominé tout le développement de la conscience s'étend à tous les phénomènes de l'esprit, et la absolute determinations : the absolute is close to us only through its self-presentation, and not through any arbitrary propaedeutic. 14 The absolute appears in the Phiinomenologie not merely as presentation but as a specifically philosophie presentation. The effieaeious effeet of philosophie presentation as the pure element of absolute presence in whieh that presence aehieves perfeet self-eertainty is the result -and most importantly -the presupposition of the system of science. This raises the question as to whether philosophie recolleetion and presentation ean sympathetieally look baek on non-philosophie life and repeat that life aeeording ta the concept without inadvertently altering its partieular essence.
And if the answer is no, then we must wonder whether the path of phenomenal knowing ean truly aet as a ladder from non-philosophie natural eonseiousness to the stand point of philosophie science, or whether that path is not sim ply the philosophie comprehension of non-philosophie life, -and thus the esoterie possession of a few individuals.
These questions turn on the ability of Hegel ta demonstrate that the truth of philosophie presentation is somehow already implieit in the determinations of spirituallife. And if this demonstration is to be eonvineing "for us", then it must be c1early evident that eontemporary non-philosophie life needs this presentation at the present moment if it is to supersede the spiritual divisions of its own making. In summary, an investigation into the mode of presentation as the "final" moment of spirit's self-externalization takes us into the heart of the problems that plague natural eonseiousness at this stage of its edueational history. 14. O. Püggeler lays to rest once and for al! the theorics 01 Haering in his "Qu'est-ce que ... " op. cil .. p. 206 ff., but introduces a ncw theory which cmphasizes a shift in focus and plan (from that of a science of experience to a phenomenology of spirit) while Hegel was writing. Pôggeler centres on the chapter on Reason as the turning point in this ,hif!: "Dans la science de l'expérience, un chapitre sur la réalisation de la raison a-t-il été prévu dès le début, cela demeure douteux. Cependant ce chapitre est au fond exigé par ce plan tel que Hegel l'expose dans l'Introduction. 
